I stumble across the_earthinc’s blog and saw a lively back and forth about moral policing. Yesterday, it appeared someone posted a defense for moral policing. I found the post strange, because I rarely see posts providing arguments for the curtailing of one’s actions.
I posted a comment at hafiz’s blog, which I reproduce here:
The moral police have really funny arguments. It’s a slippery slope of sorts, I gather. It goes something like this:
Standards of morality in the public space should be regulated so as to enforce the adherence to rules laid down by God.
Does that mean that anything goes if and only if it is done in private?
The moral police would say: no! you must still obey God’s laws, but what you do in private must be your responsibility.
But if how I act in public should be enforced, shouldn’t what I do in private be enforced? The key, here, is obeying God’s laws, isn’t it, so what qualitative difference is there in a wrongful act in private and a wrongful act in public, *to me*? None, as far as I can see.
So my actions in private should come under the same scrutiny by the moral police, the same scrutiny that they impose on my actions in public.
So when I sleep with my wife - if I have one - the moral police must be present so that she doesn’t perform oral sex on me, or that I do not sodomize her. Also, if I like BDSM - surely a moral perversion - then the moral police should be present to watch me and my so-called wife, yes?
As always with all sorts of “moral policeâ€, monitoring of the public quickly becomes the monitoring of the private. The public should take note of what went on in East Germany before the Berlin wall came down.
There is no real difference between ’social’ and ‘moral’ policing, really. The outcome is the same: those who do the policing have the power. All the while one wonders what *sanction* these moral police have…
I think the issue is that moral policing implicitly assumes that one is not capable of being responsible for one’s actions in public, viz. avoiding sin. Consequently, the moral police argues that it is only right that they, the moral police, take responsibility for your actions in public.
I argue that there is no distinction between my responsibility for my actions in public and responsibility for my actions in private. Weighty matters such as my own willingness to obey God’s laws are less important than strict adherence, it seems, so much so that ‘moral police’ must regulate how I act in relation to moral dictates.
Anyway, I think that’s just one part of the argument. The second part will be the justification of moral policing on the grounds that one’s actions can potentially harm another person. This refers to actions in public which may influence other people. I find it strange, but finding it strange is not an argument. Anyway, the basis of their justification is: you have a responsibility to your community to act in a manner which does not offend their moral sensibilities.
There are some plausible replies like what are ‘morally reprehensible’ acts, how are they defined, and slippery slopes associated with how they are defined; there is the question of who the arbiters of morality are, what qualifies them, and what who watches them. But not satisfying, I’m sure there’s a good, slamdunk answer related to the ought-is dichotomy that is effective, but must think think abit.