reduced and recycled

An uprising in 1988, and now in 2007. Two generations of people in Burma seeking freedom from a repressive, secretive government which has immunized itself from external influence by cutting itself off from the global community. Any hope of a bloodless revolution is has been dispelled, though the death toll remains, for me, a key question. Just how many people have died this time?

To be objective, the generals high up in their seats of power acted decisively and effectively. They have brutally slaughtered monks, the sole remaining source of any moral high-ground on which pro-democracy activists in that country can count on. The monks have been made a gory example, and the swiftness of the army’s response, when it came, had the effect of a blitzkrieg.

Kinda like combining Rommel and Scipio: move blazingly fast, and strike at the root of your problem - isolate the monks, capture them and kill them in a space of a day or so. In killing monks, you dispel the illusion that these monks would be treated with more respect than students and activists in 1988. Killing one monk provokes anger and outrage; killing 2,000 strikes fear in the heart of the people. It says “I mean business and there is no god beyond the barrel of my gun”.

It was swift, brutal and, objectively speaking, highly effective.

Watching the tragedy unfold, I couldn’t help but think up ways to neutralize such a threat. I mean, how would you go up against a behemoth entrenched in Rangoon or Mandalay? The only answer I can think of is armed resistance. Protests have shown that they don’t work. And attacking generals in their seats of power is foolish, as the protests have proved. So: maybe this war shouldn’t be fought on these terms. There must be a way to shift the centre of gravity on the one hand, and yet strike at the source of the Burmese army’s power. I won’t speculate further.

Talking about seizing the initiative, I read this interesting post over at Elizabeth Wong’s blog here. Khairy Jamaluddin, through whatever machinations, have turned a protest into a publicity event, shifting the centre of gravity from independent youth groups bent on protesting against the Burmese government, into a presumably “UMNO-supported” event, maneuvering himself into the media spotlight and ensuring that whatever utility derived from such protests are geared toward his own aggrandizement.

It’s cheap, nasty, Machiavellian but strategically brilliant. He identified an inside man, quickly appeared on scene and immediately seized the initiative.

Seizing the initiative. What is seizing the initiative in the Malaysian context, especially with the upcoming General Elections? Opposition parties and NGOs have been bleeding the PM dry since rumours of an election surfaced. Every sign was read, and just when UMNO was able to gather momentum with pronouncements in the mainstream media, the Opposition would reveal some scandal or the other.

I think UMNO by now realizes that its usual game-plan isn’t going to work, that of waving candy and then calling snap elections. The Opposition is seizing the initiative by exploiting UMNO’s static game-plan, and playing havoc with UMNO’s static defense: in the wake of each scandal, obfuscate, promise some change and then leave things as they are. All the Opposition needs to do, I think, is to keep information on the government’s misconduct in the public eye - already a notoriously difficult exercise in Malaysia.

What is the initiative, here?